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Cybercrimes vs. Cyberliberties 1
Nadine Strosscn

Introduction for the 2009 Edition
I originally wrote my chapter in 1999, when the Internet was a fairly new
phenomenon, with which US policymakers and eourts were just beginning to
grapple. As with all new media, throughout history, too many policymakers and
others initially viewed Internet communications as posing unique new dangers to
community concerns, including personal safety and national security. Accordingly,
government officials reacted to the advent or the Internet in the classic way that
government officials have consistently reacted to new media - by restricting
freedom or speech and privacy in communications using these new media. The
original chapter discusses why such suppressive measures have not even been
effective in promoting safety and security, much less necessary to do so.
Elected officials in the USA consistently have supported measures targeting
Internet expression, and, true to America's Puritanical heritage, these measures
have specifically singled out sexually oriented expression, seeking to shield
children from viewing it. In contrast, the courts have consistently struck down such
suppressive laws, concluding that the government could more effectively promote
its child-protective goals through nonccnsorial approaches that would also respect
adults' rights.
This new Introduction explains how all of the themes and conclusions of the
original chapter remain valid despite intervening developments, including the 2001
terrorist attacks. It shows that the 1m~jor points that the 1999 chapter made about
one particular medium, at one particular historical point, concerning particular
safety and security issues that were then at the forefront of public concern, apply
more universally to other media, during other historical periods, and regarding
other safety and security concerns. The Introduction supports this generalization by
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analyzing two sets of subsequent developments. First, it shows that post-911 surveillance measures that target communications, including Internet communications, violate frccdo111 of speech and privacy without sufficient countervailing
security benefits. Second, it shows that the government's continuing efforts to suppress onlinc sexual expression, in order to protect children from seeing it, continue
appropriately to be struck down by the courts as violating free speech rights without
sufficient countcrvai ling benefits.

Overview: Plus fa Change, Plus c'est la Meme Chose 2
Many policy and legal arguments since 2001 have posited a supposedly new post911 paradig111 for many issues, including issues concerning Internet regulation and
the (non)protcction of free speech and privacy rights in the Internet context.'
However, the allegedly new terrorist dangers, and the allegedly increased _justifications for Internet regulations that restrict free speech and privacy in the na111c of the
War on Terror prove. on analysis. lo he just the same old.•
Before President George W. Bush declared a War on Terror, other US Presidents
had declared and maintained a War on Drugs and a War on Cri111c, invoking
strikingly similar rationales. Indeed. even before these metaphorical wars of the
past four decades. the USA had been engaged in a cold war, which also raised
virtually identical issues about the appropriate balance between government power
and individual rights.' The proponents of all of these metaphorical wars have
maintained, first. that the USA as a nation, as well as all individuals in the USA.
have been facing unprecedented threats lo national security, the social order. and/or
personal safety. Second, all of these advocates have maintained that. in order to
counter the threats in question. government requires increased power, including
increased surveillance power over communications, resulting in reduced free
speech and privacy rights.
In all of these contexts, though. analysis shows that al least the second part of
the common argument is overblown. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument
that the threats posed by terrorism, drugs, and cri111c arc as great as maintained by
the proponents of the various wars against them, these warriors still have not satisfied their burden of proving that the increased government powers they advocate
actually arc necessary to counter the posited threats. Worse yet, many of the new
powers are not even effective lo counh:r such threats, let alone necessary. Therefore.
they fail lo pass muster under the strict scrutiny lest that governs measures infringing on fundamental constitutional rights, including free speech and privacy. Under
that lest, the government must show not only that the rights-restrictive measure is
designed to promote a countervailing goal of compelling importance, such as
national security or public safety. The government must also show that the challenged measure is narrowly tailored or necessary to promote that goal, and that
there is no less restrictive alternative measure, which would also effectively promote the government's goal, with less cost to individual rights. 1'
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In the War on Terror, along with other recent metaphorical wars, the increased
powers the government has sought to engage in surveillance of Internet and other
communications, far from being necessary to advance the government's goals, have
to the contrary been criticized by pertinent experts as actually undermining the
government's goals. Specifically concerning increased surveillance of Internet and
other communications post-911, security and counterintelligence experts have
maintained that the government's dragnct methods have deflected scarce resources
from honing in on the communications of particular individuals regarding whom
the government has some basis for suspicion. Moreover, these dragnet methods
have dctcrrcd many communications that could provide information and insights
that could actually aid the government's countcrtcrrorism cfforts. 7
Although I initially wrote the chapter about Cybcrcrimcs and Cybcrlibcrtics in
1999. substantially before the 200 I terrorist attacks. and although the US government
(as well as governments in other countries') has contended that those attacks warrant
extensive new regulations of all communications, including on the lntcrncl,
the fundamental points and themes in that chapter remain fully applicable to
the post-911 world. Both the government arguments in favor of regulation, and the
counterarguments in favor of free speech and privacy, have rc111aincd essentially the
same. The only changes have been the particular factual details that arc cited to
flesh out what arc, at bottom. disagreements about matters of principle: how to
strike the appropriate balance between. 011 the one hand, safety and security, and,
on the other hand. liberty and privacy. Indeed, in rereading the 1999 chapter in
order to prepare this new Introduction. I was struck by how many of the pertinent
factual considerations and policy concerns that the government has stressed in our
supposedly new post-911 world were also significant before the 200 I terrorist
attacks. Even back in 1999, terrorism was of course already a major concern in the
USA and many other countries. Accordingly, al the very beginning of the chapter,
in its very first line, it recognizes that terrorism, along with crime, is a worldwide
concern. Likewise, throughout the chapter, the analysis refers regularly and
interchangeably to both crime and terrorism, in assessing competing claims about
govcrn111c11t regulation and individual freedom. In short, the following is one key
takeaway point from the 1999 chapter, which is reinforced by considering the
subsequent dcvclop111c111s: enduring general themes unify all specific debates about
whether restrictions on Internet free speech and privacy arc justified for the asserted
sake of safety and security.
The thc111es that I addressed in the 1999 chapter continue to be of general, ongoing relevance in another sense. Although that chapter's specific factual focus was
on Internet regulations. it also applies to all communications media beyond the
Internet. When I wrote the chapter, the Internet was still quite new in terms of public, political. and press awareness. Accordingly, it generated the same reactions that
all new communications media have triggered, throughout history. Proponents of
government power, as well as 111any people who arc concerned about safety and
security, maintain that the new medium raises unique new risks to these concerns,
and therefore warrants unique new regulations. Over the course of the twentieth
century. these claims were made successively about the telephone, movies, radio,
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broadcast television, cable and satellite television, video cassette recorders, and,
most recently, the Internet. The arguments arc more alike than different, and indeed
parallel the arguments made in support of shutting down that asscrtcdly dangerous
new communications innovation introduced by Johannes Gutenberg in the 15th
century - the printing press.
Since I am writing this new Introduction to the 1999 chapter almost a decade
later, the Internet is no longer so new, and hence, following the historic pattern that
has applied to other media, it is no longer regarded as uniquely dangerous. Instead,
the Internet is largely considered to be just one of many communications media, all
of which raise the same competing concerns regarding safety and liberty, weighing
for and against regulations that restrict freedom and privacy of communications.
This development, the recognition that the Internet has more in common with other
communications media than otherwise, is manifested by the fact that the recent US
communications regulations have not singled out the Internet.';
Instead, onlinc communications have been included in the same general
regulatory initiatives that also h.ivc embraced other communications media, and
this has specifically been true for post-911 regulations that the government has
advocated as countering terrorism, from the US PATRIOT Act1" in 200 I to the
Protect America Act in 2007. 11
To sum up what I have said so far, major points that the 1999 chapter made about
one particular medium, at one particular historical point, concerning particular
safety and security issues that were then at the forefront of public and political
consciousness, apply more universally to other media, during other historical periods,
and regarding other safety and security concerns. This Introduction will bolster that
overarching conclusion by summarizing the most important general points that the
1999 chapter made, and by citing some of the many intervening developments that
demonstrate their continuing validity.
The 1999 chapter made two sets of major interrelated points, which have
continuing relevance today:
I. Far from being inevitably antagonistic, safety and freedom arc often mutually
reinforcing. Many measures that arc touted as promoting safety arc in fact not
even effective, let alone necessary, which is the standard that is required by both
the US Constitution (as well as the constitutions of many other countries,
along with international and regional human rights treaties) and common
sense. These generalizations apply to measures that restrict either free speech or
privacy onlinc.
2. In addition to protecting safety in general, the US government's other most cited
justification for suppressing Internet communications has been to protect
children from the alleged adverse effects of exposure to sexually oriented
expression, which has traditionally been viewed as especially suspect in
American culture and law. Accordingly, it is not surprising that US politicians,
of both major political parties, have overwhelmingly voted in favor of laws
restricting on line sexual expression for the sake of shielding children from it. In
contrast, though, US judges have overwhelmingly ruled that these laws arc
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unconstitutional, and the judges furthermore have stressed that alternative
measures, which arc less restrictive of free speech and privacy, might well also
be more effective in advancing the government's countervailing concerns.
This Introduction will highlight the continued pertinence of these two sets of points
by briefly discussing two sets of subsequent developments. First, this Introduction
will outline the mutually reinforcing relationship of safety and frct:dom in tht: context of government surveillance of communications. including Intt:rnt:t communications, as part of its post-911 War on Terror. Second, this Introduction will discuss
the judicial rulings that have continued to strike down laws, which politicians continue to support, that suppress onlint: sexual cxprt:ssion for the sake of shielding
children.

Post-911 Surveillance Measures That Target Commmzications,
Including Internet Communications, Violate Freedom of Speech
and Privacy Without Sufficient Countervailing Security Benefits
Ever since the September 11, 200 I, terrorist attacks, the ACLU has workt:d with
ideologically diverse allies, including many national security and countcrtt:rrorism
experts, in what we have called our "Safe and Free" campaign. 12 This name highlights, specifically in the post-911 context, the single most important overarching
theme of the 1999 chapter: that safety and freedom, far from being inherently antithetical, arc often positively interrelated. That theme applies to the government's
entire arsenal in its War on Terror, but this Introduction will summarize its pertinence spcci tically to surveillance measures that target Internet communications,
along with other communications.
Starting with the PATRIOT Act, which was enacted just 45 days after the
terrorist acts, the US government has exercised increasing surveillance over all
communications, including online communications, with measures that violate the
fundamental Fourth Amendment 11 requirements of individualized suspicion and a
judicial warrant. Among other things, the PATRIOT Act vastly expanded the
government's power to issue National Security Letters (NSLs), demanding that
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) turn over information about tht:ir customers'
online communications, without any judit:ially issut:d warrants. Tht: PATRIOT Act
also impost:d a sweeping gag order on any ISP that rt:cciws an NSL. barring the
ISP from disclosing any information about this NSL to anyont:, including the
afkctt:d customt:rs. 14 Sweeping and unchet:kcd as these new powers were, we
subst:qucntly learned that the Bush Administration had secretly arrogated to itself
even more wide-ranging powers to engage in dragnet, suspicionlcss surveillance of
onlinc (and other) communications, without any judicial warrant, Llsing the
supcrsccrct National Security Agency (NSA), and also enlisting the telephone
companies to turn over their customers' data en masscY The NSA is supposed to
be engaged in foreign intelligence gathering against suspected terrorists. However,
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as the New York Times revealed in December, 2005, ic, ever since 9/1 I, the NSA
been spying on online and phone communications of completely unsuspected
(and unsuspecting) American citizens.
In addition to violating the privacy principles that the Fourth Amendment
protects, these dragnet communications surveillance measures also violate the
freedom of expression principles that the First Amendment 17 protects. Individuals
who have reason to fear that their communications will be subject to government
spying engage in self-censorship, not using the Internet to discuss or research
certain subjects. This chilling effect has especially wide-ranging repercussions
when it affects journalists, scholars, and others who seek information to distribute
to the public through their research and writings. For example, when their sources
will not communicate with them via e-mail, reasonably fearing that the government
may be spying on such communications, this violates not only the rights of the
would-be parties to these online communications; furthermore, their governmentinduced self-censorship violates the free speech rights of all potential readers of the
suppressed information. As the Supreme Court has stressed, the First Amendment
protects the right to receive information and ideas, as well as the right to purvey
them. 18 Far from being less important in a time of national security crisis, the right
to receive information, including information about government policies, is
especially important in such a context, so that We the People, 19 and our elected
representatives, can make informed decisions about the especially pressing issues
at stake.
Consistent with the foregoing principles, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU) filed a lawsuit challenging the NSA's post-911 warrantless, suspicionless
surveillance of Internet and other communications, maintaining that this domestic
spying program violates both the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment.
The trial court judge in this case, ACLU v NSA, ruled in the ACLU's favor on both
constitutional claims.21> The appellate court panel, by a 2-1 vote, dismissed the
complaint on technical, jurisdictional grounds, without addressing the merits of the
claims. 21 Notably, the only appellate court judge who did address the merits of
the case, having rejected the alleged jurisdictional bars to doing so, agreed with the
ACLU and the lower court judge that this sweeping surveillance program was
unconstitutional. 22
The ACLU's clients in ACLU v NSA included respected, ideologically diverse
journalists and scholars who were researching and writing about issues directly
related to US counterintelligence policies, including the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. 23 Therefore, not surprisingly, their sources had particular reasons to desist
from online communications, leading to suppression of information that is especially important to everyone in the USA and, indeed, around the world. In short, the
government's unwarranted, suspicionless surveillance of online communications
through this NSA program was as bad for national security as for individual rights.
This point was made as follows by one of the plaintiffs in ACLU v NSA, New York
University Professor Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan. At the time
ACLU v NSA was filed, Professor Rubin had been conducting interviews with key
individuals in Afghanistan for a report he was doing for the Council on Foreign
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Relations, making recommendations for furthering the USA's vital security interests in that strategically significant counlry. 24 As Prof. Rubin said,
[Flor me to provide analysis and updates for the American public and officials who arc
concerned about Afghanistan, I need to be able to have confidential communications. My
experience in Afghanistan convinces me that illegal programs such as warrantkss NSA
spying ... actually undermine national security.'·'

Along with other constitutional rights and civil liberties, those protected by the
Fourth Amendment arc fully consistent with promoting national security and
public saf'cty. The mutually reinforcing relationship between safety and freedom
is illustrated by the fundamental Fourth Amendment principle that is violated
by so many post-911 programs that involve sweeping surveillance of onlinc
communications: The government may not invade anyone's freedom or privacy
without individualized suspicion, a particular reason lo believe that a particular
person poses a thrcat. 26 In short, the Fourth Amendment bars dragnet surveillance
measures that sweep in broad groups of' people and their communications.27
or course, the Fourth Amendment's individualized suspicion requirement
protects individual liberty. Specifically, it protects each of us from government
surveillance of our e-mails and Web surfing based on group stereotyping and guilt
by association. 2x Moreover, this individualized suspicion requirement also promotes
national security. II channels our government's resources - in other words, our
precious tax dollars - in the most strategic, effective way toward those persons who
actually pose a threat. Precisely f'or this reason, experts in national security and
counterintelligence, as well as civil libertarians, have opposed many of the post9/11 measures that involve mass surveillance, including mass surveillance of
Internet and other comn1Unicalions. 29 In short, these measures arc the worst of both
worlds; they make all of' us less free, yet they do not make any of us more saf'c.
As noted above, one important exa111plc of the 111any doubly flawed post-9/11
mass surveillance 111casurcs, which target Internet co111munications, is the NSA
domestic spying program.)0 That program has been sweeping in countless e-mails
and telephone calls of American citizens who arc not suspected of any illegal
activity, lei alone tcrrorism.) Therefore, the program's harshest critics include FBI
agcnts.) 2 The agents complain about the huge a111oun1 of time they have been
wasting in tracking down the thousands of completely innocent Americans whose
electronic co111111unica1ions have been swept up in this NSA fishing expedition.))
This same dual flaw infects the even more sweeping secret surveillance progra111,
affecting apparently essentially all Internet and telephone communications, which
USA Today revealed in 2006,' 4 and which the ACLU is also challenging across the
country.)' This massive communications surveillance program apparcntly' 6 seeks to
collect data about all telephone and onlinc communications from all of the US
telephone companies about all of their customcrs.) 7 The government asserts that it
is using these massive customer calling records f'or data mining. The government
looks f'or pallcrns of calls according to certain mathematical formulas that, it says,
might point lo suspected tcrrorists.) 8 However, this whole data-mining approach has
been denounced as junk science by prominent experts in mathematics and computer
scicncc.) 9 For cxa111plc, this perspective was stressed by Jonathan David Farley,
1
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who is not only a matlwmatics professor al Harvard University. but also a science
fellow al Stanford University's Center for lnlcrnalional Security and Cooperation.""
As he wrote: "IT]hc National Security Agency's entire spying program seems lo
be based on a false assumption: that you can work out who might be a terrorist
based on calling pallcrns. Guilt by association is nol just bad law, it's bad
lllathcmatics." 41
The NSA domestic spying and data-mining programs, as well as many other
post-9/ l l surveillance programs. arc overly broad dragnets or fishing expeditions.
Thus, by definition. they arc doubly flawed: they sweep in loo llluch information
about loo lllany innocent people, and they make ii harder to hone in on the
dangerous ones. As one ACLU critic of these surveillance programs memorably
put it: "You don't look for a needle in a haystack by adding more hay lo the
Istack I!""'

The Government's Continuing Efforts to Suppress Sexual
Expression, for the Sake of Shielding Children from it,
Continue to Be Struck Down by the Courts as Violating
Free-Speech Rights Without Sufficient Countervailing Benefits
As the 1999 chapter explained, after the Supreme Court unanimously struck down
the first federal law censoring on! inc expression, the Communications Decency Act
(CDA),"' in the landmark case of ACLU 1· Reno,"" Congress promptly enacted a
somewhat narrower law, targeting another category of onlinc sexual expression,
which it called the Child Online Protection Act, or COPA." 1 The ACLU promptly
sought and obtained a court order enjoining the government from enforcing this
law, on the ground that ii violates fundamental free speech principles."" So far, there
have been no fewer than seven court rulings on this ACLU challenge to COPA,
induding two by the US Supreme Court, and all seven rulings have refused to lift
the injunction." 7
The many judges who have ruled in this protracted litigation have espoused a
range of reasons for the conclusion that COPA is unconstitutional, including that it
is not sufficiently narrowly tailored 10 promote its goal of shielding children from
certain onlinc sexual material that is assumed to be harmful lo minors."' In fact,
these judges have concluded that COPA is not even effective in shielding minors
from the material al issue, and that this goal could be more effectively promoted,
instead, by blocking software that individual parents install on their own children's
computers. Of course, such user-based blocking software, which is utilized only by
particular individuals who opt lo do so, is completely consistent with First
Amcndmcnl principles. Therefore, in this context, as well as the post-911 context,
the chapter's overarching conclusion is once again reaffirmed; protecting civil
liberties onlinc is fully consistent with government's countervailing concerns, far
from being antithetical to them.
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The second ti111c the Supreme Court ruled on COPA. in 2004, the Court
n:cognizcd that user-based blocking software was likely more effective than
COPA's criminal bar as a means of restricting childrcns' access to materials
har111ful to thcm ..i•, Because the trial in the COPA case had taken place in 1999,
the Supreme Court's 2004 ruling remanded the case to the trial court to
reconsider that conclusion, in light of intervening technological developments.
The second trial, on that remand. look place in the fall of 2006. Based on the
extensive. updated cvidcntiary materials presented at that second trial, following
the Supreme Court's remand, the trial court once again concluded that the
government had failed to show that COPA is the least restrictive alternative for
advancing Congress's interest in protecting minors from exposure to sexually
explicit 111atcrial on the World Wide Wcb. 50 Moreover, the court concluded that
the government "failed to show that other alternatives arc not al least as effective
as COPA." 51 To the contrary, the court concluded that user-based blocking or
filtering progra111s arc actually 111orc effective than COPA, for several reasons,
including the following: filters block sexually explicit onlinc material that is
posted outside the USA. and individual parents can customize the scltings of
filters according to the ages of their children and what type of content those
parents find objcctionablc.' 2
In sum, the courts that have ruled on COPA have repeatedly concluded that
children's onlinc safely, as well as adults' onlinc free speech, arc more effectively
promoted not through censorship, but rather through alternative measures that
enhance freedom of choice for all adults and parents. This same conclusion has also
been reached by both of the l wo expert government commissions that have recently
examined how best to shield children from onlinc sexual material that their parents
might deem inappropriate for thc111. One panel was authorized by Congress in the
COPA statute itself." and the other panel was convened by the prestigious National
Research Council (NRC).'·1 Both groups were very diverse. including leading
antipornography activists as well as Internet experts.'' The NRC panel was chaired
by Richard Thornburgh, a conservative Republican who had served as US Altorncy
General under Presidents Reagan and Bush I. All members of both commissions
rejected the proposition that onlinc sexual material should be regulated to prevent
minors from accessing ii. Instead, both groups most strongly recommended social
and educational strategics that teach children to make wise choices about using
the Intcrncl.'r, Of course. that alternative is completely consistent with free
speech rights. including the free speech rights of children thcmselvcs,' 7 as well as
those of adults.
In addition to the two post-1999 Supreme Court decisions sustaining the
ACLU's constitutional challenge to COPA, the Court has issued one other post1999 decision ruling on one other federal law that suppresses certain Internet
expression - the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA).'x Consistent with the
paltcrn that the 1999 chapter describes, this law, along with the CDA and COPA,
singles out online sexual expression in particular, and also focuses on harms that
arc assumed to be caused to children in particular as a result of viewing such
expression.'') Again following the paltcrn that the 1999 chapter outlined, the courts
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that ruled on CIPA, including the Supreme Court, have continued consistently to
limit government power to restrict adults' online free speech rights for the purported
sake or shielding minors from exposure to online sexual expression.
In 2003, in United States v American Library Association/0 the Supreme Court
narrowly construed CIPA in order to restrict its interference with adults' online free
speech and privacy rights. CIPA requires all public libraries that receive certain
government funding, as a condition or that funding, to install blocking software on
all library computer terminals, which is designed to block certain sexually oriented
material. In a fragmented ruling, with no majority opinion, six Justices in total, for
various reasons, rejected a facial challenge that the ACLU and the American
Library Association (ALA) had brought to CIPA; in other words, the ACLU and the
ALA sought to invalidate CIPA altogether, no matter how it was enforced. However,
these six Justices rejected the facial challenge only after construing CIPA very narrowly, in a way that respected the free speech and privacy rights of adults who
access the Internet at affected public Iibrarics.
Specifically, in their three separate opinions, all or these Justices stressed that
any time an adult library patron asked to have the blocking software turned off, the
library staff had to do so automatically and promptly, without seeking any information
from any such adult.r, Moreover, a majority of the Justices stressed that if
CIPA were ever enforced in a way that did infringe on the free speech or privacy
rights or adult library patrons, then CIPA would he vulnerable to a constitutional
challenge on an as-applied basis, invalidating any such cnforccment. 62
In fact, in 2006, the ACLU instituted an as-applied challenge to CIPA as it was
enforced by certain libraries in Washington state, which did block adult patrons'
access to various Internet sites, including sites that had no sexual contcnt. 6 '
1

Conclusion
Although I initially wrote my chapter in I 999. before the 200 I terrorist attacks, all
of its themes and conclusions retain their force. Analysis of the post-911 measures
for government surveillance of Internet communications reinforces the conclusion
that we need not sacrifice onlinc privacy and free speech in order to promote
personal safety or national security. Likewise, the same general conclusion, that
safety and freedom arc compatible concerns, is also reinforced by the post-1999
judicial rulings about US statutes that suppress on line sexual expression in order to
protect children from seeing it. These rulings further reaffirm that measures
suppressing Internet free speech and privacy are the worst of both worlds; they do
curtail individual liberty, but they do not effectively advance countervailing safety
or security goals.
The Thomas Jefferson insight that I quoted in the 1999 chapter remains enduringly prescient today, two centuries after he uttered it: "A society that will trade a
little liberty for a little order will deserve neither and will lose both."r'4
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Original Chapter: Introduction
Cylx:rspacc is an inherently global medium. Cybcrcrimc and terrorism arc worldwide concerns. Preserving human rights in cyberspace is also an international
concern.
This chapter reviews legal developments in the USA. which has had more legislation and litigation in this area than has any other country. Our courts' rulings. of
course, have been grounded on US law - in particular. the free-speech guarantee of
the First Amendment to our Constitution and our constitutional right or privacy.
Those same freedoms. however, arc also guaranteed under international human
rights law, under regional human rights instruments - including the European
Convention on Human Rights - and under the domestic law of nations around the
world_r,, Therefore, the principles that have guided legal developments in the USA
should be rclcvant in the British !sics and clscwhcrc, just as developments in
Britain and in other parts of the world arc relevant in the USA.

Overview of Interrelationship Between Cy he re rime
and Cyherliberties
The intcrrclationship between cybcrcrimc and cybcrlibcrtics is a broad subject that
encompasses two major subtopics. The first subtopic is the extent to which the
exercise of certain liberties - notably, free expression - may be criminalized on line
even if it would be lawful in the traditional print media. The second subtopic is the
extent to which onlinc liberties - notably, privacy - may be restricted to facilitate
punishment of established crimes, such as trafficking in child pornography or
engaging in information terrorism. In other words. the first subtopic concerns
whether government may restrict our cyberlibcrtics in order to create new crimes.
peculiar to cyberspace; the second subtopic concerns whcth1.:r government may
restrict our cybcrlibcrtics in order to prosccut1.: existing crimes. common to all
media, more cffectivcly.
In both cont1.:xts, many officials argue that we have to make trade-oils betwc1.:n
individual rights and public safety. In fact, though. this allcg1.:d t1.:nsion is ovcrsimplifi1.:d and misleading. In terms of advancing public safety, m1.:asLtrcs that stillc
cybcrlib1.:rti1.:s ar1.: often incff1.:ctive at best and counterproductive at worst. This
doubly !lawed natur1.: of laws limiting cyb1.:rlib1.:rties shows th1.: sadly proph1.:tic
nature of a statenwnt that Thomas Jefferson mad1.: to Jam1.:s Madison mtir1.: than
200 y1.:ars ago. Wh1.:n these two Am1.:rican founders w1.:r1.: co1T1.:sponding about th1.:
Bill of Rights to th1.: US Constitution, Jefferson wanKd: "A soci1.:ty that will tratk
a littk liberty for a little ord1.:r will d1.:s1.:rw neither and will los1.: both."r,r, This stat1.:m1.:nt is right on th1.: mark, for several reasons, con1.:1.:rning th1.: cuJTcnt lkbates about
cybncrim1.:s and cybcrlibcrties. First, claims about th1.: alleg1.:dly unique dangers of

I

l

122

N. Strossen

on line expression arc exaggerated. Second, the types of criminal laws and enforcement strategics that have worked effectively in other media arc also effective in
cyberspace. Third, far from harming minors, 1nuch of the online expression that has
been targeted for censorship is beneficial for them.
For these reasons, even those who specialize in protecting young people from
sexual exploitation and violence - indeed, especially those experts - oppose
Internet censorship. This is true, for example, of Ernie Allen, director of the
National Center for Missing & Exploited Children in the USA, which works
closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police agencies around
our country. Mr. Allen and his colleagues understand that the political obsession
with suppressing ideas and images that allegedly arc harmful to children's minds is
a dangerous distraction and diversion from constructive efforts to protect actual
children from tangible harm. 67
In short, cybcrcensorship docs no more good for the safety and welfare of young
people than it docs for the free-speech rights of everyone. I say "everyone" advisedly,
as young people have free speech rights of their own. 68
The same false tension between liberty and security also makes too much of the
political rhetoric about protecting onlinc privacy through such measures as strong
encryption or cryptography and anonymous communications. To he sure, law
enforcement would be aided to some extent if officials could gain access easily to
onlinc communications, just as law enforcement would receive some benefits if
officials could readily spy on all communications of any type. But such pervasive
surveillance would violate internationally respected, fundamental privacy rights. 69
The consensus of the international community is that this violation would be too
high a price to pay for reducing crime. After all, what would be the point oflimiting
our fellow citizens' interference with our personal security, only at the price of
increasing police officers' interference with the very same security? 711
This point was eloquently stated hy a great former justice of the US Supreme
Court, Louis Brandeis, who was one of the architects of the legal right to privacy
even before he ascended to the high Court 71 :
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to
the same rules of conduct that arc commands to the citizen .... Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher .... Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker it breeds contempt for law .... To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means ... that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution. 72

Just as weakened privacy protections would let government officials access online
communications by ordinary, law-abiding citizens, these same weakened protections would also enhance access to online communications hy cybercriminals and
terrorists who will not comply with government restrictions on encryption. To the
contrary, criminals and terrorists will take all available measures, including illegal
measures, to secure their own communications. Meanwhile, thanks to legal limits
on encryption, cybercriminals will prey more easily on law-abiding individuals
and businesses, and vital infrastructures will he more vulnerable to cyberterrorists.

8

Cyhercrimes vs. Cyberliberties

123

For these reasons, even some government officials have joined with cybcrlibcrtarians in opposing limits on encryption. They concur that, on balance, such limits do
more harm than good to public safcty. 73
In broad overview, the relationship between cybcrlibcrtics and crime control is
not inherently antagonistic but, rather, is often mutually reinforcing. In many
respects, law and public policy arc developing in a way that is consistent with this
perspective. US courts consistently have struck down new laws that seek to criminalize expression onlinc that would be legal in other media. Many judges who have
ruled on such laws have agreed with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
and other cybcrlibcrtarians that the laws arc not well designed for protecting children, which is their asserted goal. These judges include the entire US Supreme
Court, ruling in the landmark 1997 case that struck down the first federal Intcrncl
censorship law in the USA, the CDA, 74 in Reno v ACLU. 75
Now we have to call that case ACLU v Reno/, since the US federal government
subsequently enacted its second cybcrccnsorship law, the so-called Child On! inc
Protection Act or COPA, 76 which al the time of this writing is being fought in a case
called ACLU v Reno 11.77 It is not surprising that few politicians had t11c political
courage to oppose a law with a name like the "Child Online Protection Act."
Fortunately, though, the only judge lo rule on the law to date has agreed with us
that it not only is unconstitutional but also is unwise and misnamed, as it docs not
really protect children. Indeed, he concluded his opinion on this note:
Perhaps we do the minors of this country harm if First Amendment protections, which they
will with age inherit fully, arc chipped away in the name of their protection."

When we turn from onlinc free speech to privacy, the US courts have been likewise
supportive of our arguments that restricting cybcrlibertics cannot be justified in
terms of the alleged countervailing law enforcement concerns. For example, in
ACLU v Miller, 79 we successfully challenged a slate law that prohibited anonymous
and pseudonymous on line communications. There have, though, been fewer rulings
concerning privacy than concerning free speech in the onlinc context. Rulings
concerning privacy have been issued only by lower-level courts, and they have not
been as consistently supportive of the cybcrlibcrtics positions. 80
In the USA, the battle over onlinc privacy and encryption is being waged mostly
in the legislative and executive branches of government, rather than in the courts.
The Clinton Administration steadily opposed strong encryption, but many members
of Congress, from both major political parties, were on the other side.
Thus far, at least, the US government is quite isolated in the international
community in this respect, as most other countries allow strong encryption. 81 There
is certainly a preference for strong encryption in Europe, which in general has
stronger legal protections for privacy of communications and data than we have in
the USA 82 The Clinton Administration, however, worked hard to export its
antiprivacy, anticncryption stance around the world,8' and it did gain support from
some officials in Britain. It is essential, therefore, to understand why this stance is
as inimical to public safety as it is to personal privacy.
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Criminalizing Sexually Oriented Online Expression
With this general picture of the relationship hctwccn cyhcrlihcrlics and cyhcrcrimc, let
us next fill in some details, starting with the area where we have had the most legislation and litigalion in the USA. This is also an area of great concern in other
countries, namely, criminalizing onlinc expression that is sexually orientcd.x-1
From the moment that cyberspace first hit the puhlic radar screen in the USA,
we immediately saw political and media hysteria ahoul "cyhcrporn" and efforts to
censor onlinc expression of a sexual nature. This reaction was not surprising.
Despite Americans' general commitment to free speech, sexually oriented cxprc~sion in any medium has hccn suspect throughout our history. That is because of our
Puritanical heritage, which we share, of course, with the British Isles. One of
America's most popular humorists, Garrison Keillor, put ii this way:
My ancestors were Puritans from England [who] arrived in America in 1648 in
the hope of finding greater restrictions than were permissible under English law al
the time.''
Consistent with this long-slandi ng American tradition, we have seen many
efforts throughout the USA lo stifle onlinc sexual expression. This has transpired at
all levels of government, from the US Congress and the Clinton Administration to
local school hoards and library hoards.' 1' From a free-speech perspective, that is the
bad news about sexually oriented expression onlinc. But there is good news, too.
While elected officials mostly have supported censorship of sexually oriented onlinc
material. the courts, as I have indicated, have provided a welcome contrast. So far,
the ACLU has brought constitutional challenges to seven new laws that censor
sexually oriented material onlinc: the two federal statutes I already mcntioncd,' 7
four stale laws (in New York,xx Virginia,' 9 New Mcxico,'' 0 and Michigan'JI), and
one local law (in Loudoun County, Virginia')"). And so far, with only one recent
exception - which I do not think is too significant for cybcrlihcrtics, as I will
explain in a moment - we have won every single one of these challenges.
Moreover, these decisions affirming freedom of cyhcrspccch have been joined
in by 19 different judges who span a broad ideological spectrum. These arc judges
who were appointed by the last six US Presidents, four Republicans, and two
Democrats, going all the way back to Richard Nixon. In short, the ACLU position
on onlinc free speech is essentially the position that is now enshrined in First
Amendment law.
The one recent setback is an intermediate appellate court ruling on a Virginia
slate law that restricts government employees' access to sexually oriented onlinc
matcrial.'11 The US Supreme Court has held that the government, when ii acts as
employer, may impose more limits on its employees' expression than the government, when it acts as sovereign, may impose on its citizens' cxpression.'J 4
Nevertheless, the lower court agreed with us that Virginia's law violates even the
reduced free-speech rights of government cmployccs.'J' The intermediate appellate
court suhscqucntly overturned that decision in Fehruary, 1999, on the hroad rationale that government employees, when they act primarily in their role as employees,
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have no free-speech rights concerning any communications in any mcdium.'Jr, This
court maintained that it was not imposing special restrictions on expression in
cyhcrspacc as opposed to other media: rather, it was imposing special restrictions
on expression by government employees, regardless of the medium. We think this
ruling is wrong. and we hope to overturn it on further appeal. In any event, though.
it really has no special impact specifically on cyhcrlaw or cybcrlibcrtics.
In contrast. our two most recent victories in cybcrccnsorship cases do have
broad positive implications for onlinc free speech, and I would like to describe
them. First, let me tell you a bit more about our lower court victory in February,
1999. in ACLU \' Reno If. against the second federal cybcrccnsorship law, COPA.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision striking down the CDA in ACLU /, 97
Congress wrote a somewhat less sweeping law the second time around. The CDA
had criminalized any onlinc expression that is "patently offcnsivc" 9 x or "indecent."')') In contrast, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) outlaws any onlinc
communication "for commercial purposcs" 100 that includes any material that is
harmful to minors. 1111
Both ofCOPA's critical terms arc defined broadly. First, a communication is "for
commercial purposes" if it is made "as a regular course of. .. trade or business, with
the objective of earning a profit," even if no profit is actually madc. 102 Therefore,
COPA applies to many not-for-profit Web sites that provide information completely
free, including the ACLU's own Web site. Second. material is "harmful to minors"
if it satisfies US law's three-part obscenity definition specifically with respect to
minors. namely, if it appeals to the prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive, and
lacks serious value from a minor's pcrspcctivc. 101
I should note that the ACLU opposes the obscenity exception that the US
Supreme Court has carved out of the First Amendment (over the dissenting votes
of many respected justices). 1114 However, we have not used our cyhcrccnsorship
cases as occasions for challenging that exception. In other words, we have not challenged these new laws to the extent that they simply transplant to cyberspace existing free-speech exceptions that have been upheld in other media, in particular,
obscenity, child pornography. and solicitation of a minor for sexual purposes.
Rather, what we have actively opposed in these new laws is their creation of new,
broader categories of expression that arc unprotected specifically onlinc, even
though it would be constitutionally protected in traditional print media.
With that perspective. let me turn hack lo ACLU v Reno II. On Fchruary I, 1999,
a federal judge, Lowell Recd, granted our motion for a preliminary injunction. 10 '
He enjoined the government from enforcing COPA pending the trial on the merits.
Judge Recd hdd that we had shown the necessary "likelihood of success" on the
merits of our claim that COPA violates the First Amendment for many of the same
reasons that CDA did. Since COPA regulates expression that is protected "at least
as lo adults," 106 Judge Recd ruled. it is presumptively unconstitutional unless the
government can satisfy the demanding "strict scrutiny" test. It has to show both that
the law's puq1ose is to promote an interest of "compelling" importance and that the law
is narrowly tailored to promote that purpose: in other words, that there arc no "less
restrictive alternative" measures that would he less burdensome on free spcceh. 107
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Judge Recd concluded that the government docs have a compelling interest in
shielding minors even from materials that arc not obscene by adult standards. 100
However, he also concluded that the government was unlikely to be able to show
that COPA is the least restrictive means of achieving this goal. 10'' He noted, for
example, that the evidence befrire him "reveals that blocking or filtering technology
may be at least as successful as COPA would be in restricting minors' access to
harmful material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally protected
speech that COPA imposes on adult users or Web site opcrators." 110 The government has appealed from Judge Reed's ruling. 111 Quite likely, this case will go all the
way to the US Supreme Court that has issued only one decision on the "harmful to
minors" doctrine, and that was more than 30 years ago. 112
Now let me turn to a second victory, in another important cybcrspcech case, which
also is still working its way through the court system at the time of this writing. This
case is called Mainstream Loudoun v Loudoun County Lihrwy,m and it is so far the
only court ruling on the burgeoning controversy over tillering and blocking software.
Ever since it became clear that the CDA and other direct censorial measures arc
facing constitutional difficulties, advocates of suppressing on line sexual expression
stepped up their promotion of rating and filtering systems, which also would bar
access lo the same expression. The ACLU has issued two reports explaining many
reasons why all these systems arc problcmatic. 114 For one thing- in terms of blocking all the material it purports lo, and only that material - the filtering software is
inevitably both undcrinclusive and overinclusivc. Therefore, while individual
Internet users certainly have the right lo install software on their own computers
that blocks out material they consider contrary to their values, there is still a problem. Almost all manufacturers of blocking software refuse to disclose either the
sites they block or the criteria they use to determine which sites they will block.
Consequently, the manufacturers arc imposing their value choices on their customers. Manufacturers arc not facilitating the customers' exercise of their own freedom
of choice. In short, this is really more of a consumer protection problem than a
free-speech problem.
There is a serious free-speech problem, however, when the filtering software is
installed not as a matter of choice by individual users but, rather, by government
officials who control the computers in public institutions. Across the USA, officials
arc busily installing or advocating blocking software on computers in public
libraries, schools, and univcrsitics. 11 ' Individual choice thereby is stripped from the
many members of the public whose only access to the Internet is through such
computers. For them, the installation of filtering software on, say, library computers
has the same censorial impact as the removal of books from library shelves.
Book banning, in fact, is precisely the analogy that was invoked by the only
court that has ruled on this issue to date. In November, 1998, federal judge Leonie
Brinkema upheld a First Amendment challenge to mandatory filtering software that
had been installed in the public libraries of Loudoun County, Virginia. 116 Pursuant
to a "Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment," library officials required software to
block "child pornography and obscene material," as well as material deemed
"harmful to juveniles" under state law. 117
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As an aside - hut an important one - I want to note the distorted, overbroad
concept of sexual harassment that is reflected in this policy, along with too many
others. The policy assumes that the presence of sexually oriented expression on
library computer terminals ipso facto constitutes illegal sexual harassment. l3ut that
assumption is patently incorrect. As the US Supreme Court has held. expression
docs not give rise lo a sexual harassment claim merely because a person at whom
it is directed considers it offensive. 118
Even beyond their misguided concept of sexual harassment, library officials
also implemented their policy in a way that violated onlinc First Amendment
rights, and that was the focus of Judge Brinkema's ruling. Specifically. the library
installed a commercial software product called "X-Stop." Judge l3rinkcma held
that the filtering requirement operated as a presumptively unconstitutional "prior
restraint" on expression. Therefore, it had to withstand the same type of strict
judicial scrutiny that also has been applied to other censorial laws. such as CDA
and COPA. 11 "
Judge Brinkema assumed for the sake of argument that the govcrnmcnt's
asserted intercsts - namely, its interests in minimizing access to obscenity and child
pornography and in avoiding thc creation of a scxually hostile environment - were
of compelling importancc. 1211 Shc concluded, howcvcr, that the blocking policy was
unconstitutional on several independently sufficient grounds: ( 1) it is not necessary
lo further the govcrnmcnt's asscrtcd interests. (2) it "is not narrowly tailored,"(:\)
ii limits adult patrons to accessing only material that is fit for minors. (4) ii "provides inadequate standards for rcstricting a<.:ccss." and (5) "it provides inadequate
proccdural safeguards to cnsure prompt judicial rcvicw." 121
One particularly interesting featurc of Judge Brinkcma's analysis is her catalog
of ''less n.:strictivc means" that Loudoun County could have used to pursue its
asserted interests: installing privacy screcns, charging library staff with casual
monitoring of Internet use, and installing filtering software only on some Internet
terminals and limiting minors 10 those terminals, and installing filtering software
that could be turned off when an adult is using thc terminal. 122 Significantly, Judge
Brinkcma cautioned that while all of the foregoing alternatives arc less restrictive
than thc challenged mandatory filtering policy, shc did not "find that any of them
would neccssarily he constitutional," sincc that question was not before her. 12 '
Loudoun County officials decided not to appeal from Judge Brinkema's ruling. 12 ~
Of course, the constitutional questions involved will not bc settled until thc US
Supreme Court rules on them in another filtering controversy. 12 '

Debates About Online Privacy and Cryptography
This section discusses furthcr the second major aspect of the cyberliberties/cybercrime debate - the controversy about on line privacy and encryption or cryptography.
Advocates of restricting encryption argue that, as the price for barring criminals and
terrorists from using effective cryptography, wc must also bar law-abiding citizens
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and businesses from doing so. This rationale was debunked effectively by Brian
Gladman in "Cybcr-Crimc and Information Terrorism," an excellent report that was
issued in September, 1998:
Many things arc valuahlc to criminals and terrorists hut this alone does not provide a reason
for imposing controls .... [C]riminals find cars useful but society doesn't control the supply
of cars because of this. 126

In light of this passage, it is ironic to note that when the automobile was first
invented, law enforcement officials did seek to restrict its use, precisely because
they did fear that it would facilitate criminal activitics. 127 Today that argument
seems ludicrous but, at bottom, it is precisely the same as the one now being offered
in an attempt to justify restrictions on cryptography.
This is the argument the Clinton Administration made. They insisted that the
only kind of encryption technology that should be available is "key recovery" or
"key escrow" cryptography. Yet this type of encryption is inherently insecure, as it
is expressly designed to give covert access to the plaintcxt of encrypted data to a
third party, in particular, the government.
Although some government officials contend that there is a conflict between
cyberliberties and cybercrime or cyberterrorism, that in fact is not so. To the
contrary, this situation vividly illustrates Thomas Jefferson's previously quoted
observation: "Liberty and security concerns work in tandem, rather than in tension,
with each other. Indeed, it is particularly apt, in the cryptography context, to refer
to Jefferson's communications with Madison; when these two American founders
corresponded prior lo the signing of the Declaration of Independence, they encoded
all their messages. They used eighteenth-century-style encryption !" 12 K
Notwithstanding the Clinton Administration's adamant official position, individual officers and agencies in the US government have broken ranks. One important example is a high-level government committee, the National Research Council
(NRC) committee on cryptography. In its 1996 report, this committee concluded
that strong encryption is essential for promoting law enforcement and national
security:
If cryptography can protect the trade secrets and proprietary information of
businesses and thereby reduce economic espionage (which it can), it also
supports in a most important manner the job of law enforcement. If cryptography
can help protect nationally critical information systems and networks against
unauthorized penetration (which it can), it also supports the national security of
the USA. 129
Accordingly, even though this NRC report recognized that restricting encryption
would strengthen some law enforcement efforts, it nevertheless concluded the
following:
On balance, the advantages of more widespread use of cryptography outweigh
the disadvantages. 130
Some of the reasons for this conclusion were outlined as follows in a September,
1998, GILC report that focused specifically on the precise type of cryptography
regulation that the USA has enforced and advocated, that is, export restrictions:
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[E]xport controls on cryptography hurt law-abiding companies and citizens without having
any significant impact on the ability of criminals, terrorists or belligerent nations to obtain
any cryptographic products they wish.
[E]xport restrictions imposed by the major cryptography-exporting states limit the ability
of other nations to defend themselves against electronic warfare attacks on vital
infrastructure.
[F]ailurc to protect the free use and distribution of cryptographic software will jeopardize
the life and freedom of human rights activists, journalists and political activists all over the
world.
(A]ny restriction on the use of cryptographic programs will be unenforceable in practice,
since the basic mathematical and algorithmic methods for strong encryption arc widely
published and can easily be implemented in software by any person skilled in the art.
[T]he increasingly common use of public networks to electronically distribute such products in intangible form reinforces the uncnforceability of export controls.'"

For these reasons, restrictions on encryption arc not even effective, let alone necessary,
in countering cybcrcrimc. On this ground alone, such restrictions should be
rejected. But there arc also additional grounds for this conclusion.
For one thing, the government cannot show that there is in fact a substantial
danger of the specific type of crime that is claimed most urgently to warrant restrictions on cryptography, namely, information terrorism. Fortunately, claims about
this potential problem turn out to be greatly overblown. This was shown, for example, by a recent study, published in the Fall 1998 issue of the Internet publication,
Issues in Science and Tec/z11ology Online. Its title effectively summarizes its conclusion: "An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely."
The study was written by George Smith, an expert on computer crime, security,
and information warfarc. 132 He dismissed government and media descriptions of the
dangers of cybcrtcrrorism as "myths," 1" "hoaxcs," 114 and "the electronic ghost
stories of our timc." 135 Although the Smith study focused on the USA, it is no doubt
relevant for other countries also. Herc is its conclusion:
The government's evidence about US vulnerability to cybcr attack is shaky at best. ...
Although the media arc full of scary-sounding stories about violated military Web sites and
broken security on public and corporate networks, the menacing scenarios have remained
just that-only scenarios .... [An examination of the] sketchy information that the government
has thus far provided .... casts a great deal of doubt on the claims.'"'

Precisely the same conclusion was reached in a report by a commission appointed
by President Clinton on "Critical Infrastructure Protcction." 117 The Commission
was charged with analyzing the danger that information terrorists could pose to our
nation's infrastructure - communications lines, power grids, and transportation
networks. The Commission consisted primarily of military and intelligence officials and therefore was presumed to be especially sympathetic toward government
claims of threats to law enforcement and national security. Yet even this group was
forced to acknowledge that there was "no evidence of an impending cybcr attack
which could have a debilitating effect on the nation's critical infrastructurc." 11 x
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Nonetheless, that recognition did not deter the Commission from seizing upon
the fear of cybcrtcrrorism to press for government measures - including key
recovery encryption - that constrict individuill rights. Indeed, the Commission was so
cager to leverage public concerns about infotcrrorism into heightened government
surveillance over the public that it disregarded the countervailing dangers that key
recovery encryption poses to the very infrastructure that the Commission was
created to protcct! 119 Brian Gladman described those dangers well in "Cybcr-Crimc
and Information Terrorism," the report from which I quoted earlier:
Increasingly. the economics or the developed (and developing) nations arc dependent on
networked computing resources. Irrespective of whether it is communications, electrical
power generation. road. rail or air transport. stock exchanges. hanks. finance houses. agriculture. hospitals or a host of other infrastructures. all now depend on regular and continuous information exchanges between networked computer systems for their continuing safe
operation. In the absence of effective cryptographic protection the computer systems that
keep these infrastructures operating arc wide open to attacks by terrorist and criminal
organisations using only modest resources. Cryptographic export controls arc pn:vcnting
the protection of these civil inrraslructurcs and rendering them easy and tempting targets
for international terrorists and criminals. Far from impeding crime and terrorism. therefore.
controls on cryptography an; having precisely the opposite impact.'"'

These same dangers had been heralded in "The Risks of Key Recovery. Key
Escrow, and Trusted Third Party Encryption," a May, I 997, report by a group of
authors who call themselves "an Ad Hoc Group or Cryptographers and Computer
Scientists":
Any key recovery infrastructure. by its very nature. introduces a new and vulnerable path
to the unauthorized recovery of data where one did not otherwise exist. This .... creates new
concentrations of decryption information that arc high-value targets for criminals or other
attackers .... The key recovery infrastructure will lend to create extremely valuable targets.
more likely to be worth the cost and risk of attack.'"

In sum, not only arc claims about the dangers of cybcrtcrrorism exaggerated but
also the proposed countermeasures - notably, restrictions on cryptography - far
from being necessary to respond to any such dangers, arc not even effective; to the
contrary, they arc counterproductive. A number or government reports present
precisely the same conclusions. In September, 1999, for example, a European
Parliament report called for rejecting encryption controls, including those advocated
by the USA. 14 ' Significantly. this report was issued in the wake or increasing
evidence or unjustified surveillance by law enforcement agencies in various
European countries. Indeed, the vast majority or governments that have considered
the issue have opposed restrictions on encryption. 14 ' This pattern was documented
by a comprehensive report that GILC issued in February, 1998, entitled C,yptography
and Liherty /998. This report surveyed the cryptography policies of all countries in
the world, based on direct communications with their governments. It concluded
that, in most countries, cryptography may be freely used, manufactured. and sold
without restriction:
For those jcountricsj that have considered the topics. interests in electronic commc1-cc and
privacy appear lo outweigh the concerns expressed by law enforcement. 144
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Conclusion
Everyone who values human life and human rights must, of course, he vigilant
against the fear, insecurity, and manipulation caused by terrorists and other
criminals. But we must also he vigilant against the fear. insecurity, and manipulation
eauscd by those who seek to fight against criminals.
In a classic 1927 opinion, the great US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
cautioned against ceding our hard-won freedoms to even well-intentioned government agents. Tellingly. that opinion warned against electronic surveillance and
restrictions on free speech and privacy with respect to the then-newest communication technology - the telephone - despite claims about the urgent need to fight
against telephonic crime.
Justice Brandeis's stirring. prophetic words apply fully to clectronie survcillanec
and restrictions on free spcceh and privaey with rcspcet to the now-newest eommunication technology - cyberspace - despite claims about the urgent need to fight
against cyhercrimes and information terrorism. As Justice Brandeis warned:
Experience should teach us to he most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's
purposes arc beneficent. ... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men or zeal. well-meaning hut without understanding.'"'
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